This article examines a period of rapid policy change following decades of stability in UK tobacco. It seeks to account for such a long period of policy stability, analyse and qualify the extent of change, and explain change using a 'multiple lenses' approach.
. This, combined with measures such as smoking cessation and health education, now makes the UK the most progressive member state in the EU (see Joosens and Raw, 2006 ). Yet for most of the post-war period tobacco policy was marked by stability. Tobacco control measures were voluntary rather than legislative, while public health arguments often came secondbest to those based on individual choice and the economic benefits of tobacco.
The aim of this article is to critically analyse these developments: to account for such stability; to analyse the extent of change; and, to explain these events using models of policy change. Of particular relevance are the advocacy coalition framework and punctuated equilibrium which seek to explain sudden change despite the presence of powerful policy networks. Other models -including policy transfer and multi-level governance -aid explanation by focussing on activity 'above and below' the UK, while multiple streams analysis points to idiosyncratic elements of change.
However, the article does not seek to confirm the value of one particular model. Rather, it constructs three arguments drawing on the idea of 'narratives' of policy explanation (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2003) . First, apparent change does not mean actual change. The article challenges researchers to be careful about assuming the scope and nature of policy change before embarking on explanation. The discussion of measurement, and the development of two narratives, shows the level of competition to define the scope and nature of policy change. Second, the selection of one narrative at the expense of another determines the value of these models. For example, models describing 'external' factors have more value if we demonstrate 'internal' inertia based on policy network dominance. If, instead, the network was open and conducive to long-term policy change then external influence is less impressive. Third, the 'multiple lenses' approach gives a more complete explanation of policy change. The article employs each model as a tool, to make them work for the case study rather than vice versa. As Allison (1969: 715-6 ) argues, the fact that different analysts relying on different models produce different explanations suggests the need for introspection. Policy analysts face the same problems as 'rational' decision-makers: an infinite wealth of potentially relevant information to choose from but finite resources with which to choose. As a result they focus their attention to one particular aspect of explanation. Employing more than one model does not solve this problem but it does highlight a series of perspectives through which to view the same phenomenon.
The article concludes with a discussion of generalisability. It suggests that while UK tobacco policy is broadly consistent with international policy change, the results are at variance with much of what we know about British politics. However, the same can be said for most case studies. Policy outcomes vary by the stage of the policy cycle, level of government and policy sector. Policy analysis is therefore devoted to juggling parsimonious explanation with the acknowledgement of complexity. This article addresses both concerns by applying a multiple lenses approach to detailed case study analysis.
Policy Stability: A Smoking Policy Community?
Stability came from an insulated industry-government relationship underpinned by socio-economic conditions. However, the value of tobacco to government varies by source. For example, Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) estimates 40000 direct and indirect jobs in 1979 while the Tobacco Advisory Council (TAC) suggests 300,000, with many in economically depressed and/ or marginal constituencies (Taylor, 1984: 69) . In 1981 £4 billion was raised in taxes (equivalent in cash to the £9.3 billion raised in 2003), tobacco was a successful industrial export, the prevalence of smoking was high (51% of men and 41% of women in 1974), and tobacco control was seen as a vote loser by politicians (Baggott, 1988; ASH, 2005a) . This underpins Read's (1992) identification of a producer dominated policy network. The practical basis for dominance was the long-term relationship between the industry and government, cemented during World War Two when TAC's predecessors 2 were set up to ensure the supply of cigarettes. TAC represented the 4 main domestic tobacco companies and could claim high representational legitimacy. Direct TAC lobbying to senior ministers was supplemented by support from sports and arts ministers (because of the level of sponsorship) and MPs acting as tobacco consultants or from constituencies with a strong tobacco presence (Taylor, 1984: 69-71 (Baggott, 1988: 18) . Newspaper advertising revenue [£17m in 1981 (or £39m in 2006) -Taylor, 1984: 49] ensured that few anti-smoking stories were published, and TAC had a close relationship with the (self-regulating) Advertising Authority which feared that a ban would set a costly precedent (Baggott, 1988: 21) . Read (1992) suggests that this policy monopoly was surrounded by an issue network.
In the 1950s and 1960s this included the Royal College of Physicians (RCP), followed in the 1970s by ASH and the British Medical Association (BMA). While the tobacco industry often engaged in debates within the wider issue network (calling on FOREST, the retailers or unions), public health interests were excluded from the core network. Compared to the present day, ASH was not well funded, the BMA was not well organised, and cancer charities were not active (Baggott, 1988: 15) . The antitobacco campaign was still in its infancy by the 1970s and ASH could not be too critical of a government providing 95% of its income (Taylor, 1984: 43) . As a result, tobacco companies controlled the policy image of tobacco. The framing of tobacco as an economic issue -jobs, tax revenue, exports -was the basis for support from the Treasury, DTI and Department of Employment. Further, framing the issue as a matter of individual choice explained why increasingly accepted links between smoking and illness did not result in significant policy change.
Measuring Policy Change
Recent tobacco legislation therefore appears to mark a symbolic and substantive shift from the past, but how do we demonstrate or qualify this? We situate these new regulations within a wider discussion of tobacco policy instruments and use these categories to examine policy change over an extended period. The exercise suggests that accounts of change are intertwined with normative issues (how much change there should be) as well as competing narratives on the role and intentions of government. Adapting and extending Studlar (2004: 191) we have eight relevant policy instruments:
1. Regulation -on advertising, smoking in public places, sales of cigarettes and levels of tar.
2. Economic incentives (subsidies to farmers, tax expenditure on arts sponsorship) and penalties (taxation, litigation).
3. Public education -including the ratio of health education to tobacco advertising.
4.
Smoking cessation services and nicotine replacement therapy.
Funding external organisations (such as ASH).
6. Funding scientific research (through the Medical Research Council).
7. Tackling tobacco smuggling.
8. Levels of enforcement and the scale of punishment. This is particularly relevant to the history of voluntary agreements.
The point of identifying a range of policy instruments is that a focus on regulation alone exaggerates policy change. Looking at other measures also helps us characterise the trajectory of change -for example, the argument (below) that recent legislation marks an incremental step rather than sea change draws on the evidence of complementary policy measures.
Narratives of Policy Change
Interviews suggest a fundamental disagreement on what recent events represent -do they demonstrate successful pressure on a government reluctant to legislate and challenge tobacco interests, or reflect a logical progression from incremental steps already taken by government? Table 1 (Read, 1996: 70 (Berridge and Loughlin, 2005, 960; Taylor, 1984) .
Second, Baggott (1988: 44-5) (Read, 1996: 36; 54 This narrative suggests that the policy network was never as closed as Read (1992) suggests. Scientific and medical advice was always present and ASH was a government-funded pressure group whose role was fostered by civil servants. Its exclusion from formal negotiations with government was caused by its unwillingness to work with tobacco companies (Berridge 1999 (Berridge : 1188 . Further, what looked like government inactivity due to industry dominance was often a failure to accept epidemiological evidence or an unwillingness to risk the electoral fallout of legislation (Berridge, 2004: 119) . The public health stance was eventually successful in changing demand for tobacco and attitudes towards policy. The constant production of evidence on illness, demands of ASH and introduction of MP bills were used by government as leverage in negotiations with the industry. ASH's lack of formal contact also contrasted with its work behind the scenes with the Treasury (Read, 1996: 120) , while DTI attitudes varied by minister (Berridge, 2004: 119) .
The alternative 'dominance' narrative characterises UK policy as a series of minimal responses to public health pressure. From 1956-9 the Ministry of Health spent less than £5000 (£70,000 in 2006 terms) on anti-smoking messages compared to £27 million (£376m) of tobacco advertising (Taylor, 1984: 5) . The demands from government on the industry were light, with the use of filter tips in cigarettes and funding to the Medical Research Council (£250,000, or £3.5m in 2006) the most significant (Read, 1996: 43) . Although epidemiological proof of the link between smoking and illness was accepted by government in the 1960s, any policy change still required chief medical officers and health ministers working together. So, while
George Godber (CMO from 1960-72) encouraged the RCP to publish reports on the links between smoking and health, the results were not seen as reason enough to legislate to restrict advertising by Health Minister Enoch Powell (Taylor, 1984: 7) . legislation. These were chosen not because they worked but because legislation would be unpopular. Since the threat to legislate had no political weight, there was little incentive for tobacco companies to take the agreements seriously.
The most significant progress in the 1970s -on public transport -was caused by concerns for safety rather than health (Read, 1996: 7) . The threat of legislation was not revisited until 1974 by Health Minister Dr David Owen. His plan was to classify tobacco as a medicine and therefore control its content and promotion. Yet the lack of a working majority in Westminster hindered legislative progress and Owen had become Foreign Secretary by the time a majority was achieved (Taylor, 1984: 94) .
Within the post-1979 Thatcher government, Sir George Young was an active but junior health minister who moved for a ban on advertising and sports sponsorship.
This was seen by many Conservative MPs and ministers (including Thatcher) as an attack on 'freedom not cigarettes'. The proposal was rejected and Young was shunted to another department (1984: 145) .
The history of voluntary agreements is therefore one of slow movement and limited government 'bite'. Much policy change was easy for the industry to acceptintroducing filter tips which helped marketing to women and persuaded some that they were smoking safely; stopping advertising on high tar cigarettes which had a low and declining market share, and limiting advertising expenditure which suited the companies with the highest market shares. Other measures, such as health warnings on cigarette packs, were traded for the ability to use brand names in advertising (Read, 1996: 58) . While advertising expenditure was capped, this was neither policed effectively nor matched by health education spending. Most health ministers used the agreements to look like they were acting, with the Treasury on hand to block those who tried to go further (1996: 50-4).
Post-war UK policy contrasts with greater advances in the US (Read, 2005) and
Norway (Baggott, 1988) . and, 'Health bodies were up in arms. All pubs had to do was put a sticker up in the window to say it was a smoking pub. So everyone put up stickers!' (interview, ASH Scotland 2004). 4 A very small proportion of pubs went smoke-free, while those with non-smoking areas relied on ventilation systems that the tobacco industry knew were limited (Leavell et al, 2006: 227-8) .
Narratives and Models of Policy Change
The discussion of narratives shows the level of competition to define the nature of policy change. Since both present convincing accounts of policy development, we need to be careful about assuming a policy's history before examining recent events.
This point is crucial to the explanatory power of models of policy change: their value is inextricably linked to the narrative of policy change that we select. We can demonstrate this in a discussion of two main types of explanation. The first directs attention to influence from 'above and below' the UK. This is most valuable if we select the dominance narrative which suggests post-war policy stability and inertia.
Recent change has been profound and only made possible by a successful challenge to existing relationships, helped by events external to the network. Explanations highlighting external influence are less impressive if we select the incremental narrative which suggests that recent legislation is a logical progression from existing policy with an established trajectory. This suggests that external influence had little effect on policy change. The second type of explanation uses policy networks analysis to account for periods of stability and change. While the advocacy coalition framework can be consistent with both narratives, punctuated equilibrium depends on the dominance narrative of policy development.
Policy Change From Above and Below
UK policy follows the broad trends identified in Studlar's (2004) analysis of developed countries. Most have advertising bans on TV and radio (with sponsorship more difficult to address), cigarette warning labels, health education campaigns since the 1960s and taxation since the 1980s. Full advertising bans and public places have only recently become realistic issues. A common theme is the post-war debate on the links between smoking and illness, replaced by more established medical evidence but relentless challenges by tobacco to the policy implications (Feldman and Bayer, 2004: 1) . Responses have varied according to the 'vested economic interests, cultural practices, and political factors' of each country (Studlar, 2004) . Therefore, we need to dig deeper to find the causal mechanisms involved. Models stressing influence from above-and-below include: The effect of this directive on the UK is not straightforward. There is coercive transfer to an extent, with a proxy counterfactual provided by Germany which will now implement TAD2 following an unsuccessful appeal. However, the Labour party was already committed to banning tobacco advertising in its 1992 manifesto. But what is the upshot of this influence? The dominance narrative suggests that with advertising we see a significant impetus to act from above and below, and with public places we see pressure based on embarrassment. Yet, the UK government introduced legislation on advertising beyond the minimum requirements of the EU. 
Policy Networks and External Factors
A key concern of policy networks analysis is the relationship between 'internal' explanations for policy stability and 'external' reasons for policy change (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 260-1) . External factors may include:
1. Ideological change following the election of a new government.
2. Change from 'above and below'.  Rising imported and illegally imported market shares. Before the 1980s almost all tobacco consumed in the UK was from a domestic source, meaning that UK tobacco consumption supported UK employment (Baggott, 1988: 45) 5. Social change: The key is to show that these factors influence the direction of policy but do not determine it. The common element is mediation -the weight or interpretations placed on these factors by decision makers and pressure participants.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework
The ACF focuses on sectoral level subsystems which include more actors than policy communities: 'not only interest group leaders, but also agency officials, legislators from multiple levels of government, applied researchers, and perhaps even a few journalists' (Sabatier, 1998: 103; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) . The glue that binds actors within competing coalitions is 'belief systems'. These range from 'core'
beliefs (e.g. the relative priorities of freedom and health), 'policy core' (the proper scope of government) and secondary aspects (the best way to deliver policy). Core values are the least susceptible to change -'akin to a religious conversion ' (1993: 221) -while policy beliefs may only change following external 'shocks' to the subsystem (such as changing socio-economic conditions). Secondary aspects are more subject to change following policy-learning (such as environmental policy shifting from command-and-control to economic incentives). These beliefs are refined according to new information and the 'enlightenment function' of policy analysts. Advocacy coalitions not only compete for position within subsystems (with a role for a neutral 'policy broker') but also revise their strategic positions based on new evidence and the need to react to external events. We therefore have stable and dynamic elements. Stability comes from the parameters of policy -the constitutional structure, fundamental social structures and values -and perhaps dominance by one coalition. Change comes from reactions to external events (which may undermine dominance) and the assimilation of new evidence (mediated by existing beliefs).
The ACF replaces the idea of a producer network within an issue network. Rather, we have pro-and anti-tobacco coalitions. While pro-tobacco dominated the post-war period it still engaged with anti-tobacco in competition to interpret information and seek favour from the policy broker. There was no 'partisan mutual adjustment' in the early post-war period. Rather, adjustment (or policy learning) is made by a dominant coalition in the face of changing information and external environments. More significant policy change comes from external shocks to the system -a new government with different ideas, increasing EU influence, or shifting public opinion.
These shocks are mediated, with the pro-tobacco coalition adapting (or learning) to maintain its dominant position -introducing filters for cigarettes, funding medical research, voluntarily restricting advertising and providing ventilation in public places.
So, while the anti-tobacco coalition may now dominate the subsystem, the value of ACF is in explaining why such a shift took so long. Much of the delay was achieved through the constant re-appraisal of new evidence, from the post-war rejection of the scientific evidence on illness, to more recent scepticism about the level of risk from
passive smoking and what constitutes a proportionate response.
However, there are problems with this interpretation. First, the ACF explains stability better than change. Policy change of any magnitude tends to be explained by external shocks rather than the coalitions themselves (John, 1999; Cairney, 1997 (Read, 1992) . This suggests that policy brokerage -a benign concept within the ACF -is more important to the success of coalitions than their own strategies. Finally, since the coalitions are broad it is difficult to track the significance of venue shift. Within the ACF the constitutional structure represents stability. However, the evidence from MLG is that the constraints provided by constitutional structures are fluid, providing more change than stability.
Punctuated Equilibrium
The focus of punctuated equilibrium is to explain long periods of policy stability punctuated by short but intense periods of change. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) suggest that since decision makers, the media and the public all have limited resources If this new image is stifled by policy monopolies, then groups pursue 'aggressive venue-shopping' to seek influential audiences elsewhere (the courts, other types of government, the media, the public - Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 5) . Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 93) describe this process in the US. In the early 20 th century tobacco attracted minimal media attention and most government attention was favourable. Tobacco enjoyed a glamorous image and consumption was high.
However, since the 1960s we have seen heightened and negative media coverage and a drop in cigarette consumption. This negative attention causes a reappraisal of the positive aspects -for example, the economic benefits are undermined by a focus on rising health insurance and decreasing worker productivity (1993: 114) . Similar shifts of media attention, smoking prevalence and public attitudes are apparent in the UK, reflecting increased acceptance of the scientific evidence linking smoking (and then passive smoking) to illness. Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 87; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) suggest that there is a direct causal link between this type of attention and rapid policy change. Peak periods of organisation change, 'generally coincided with Gallup Poll data showing public concern with the same problems'.
However, this demonstration of cause is problematic. First, while the US displayed high and negative levels of attention and possessed the most organised public health lobby, the federal response to tobacco has rarely been as intense. Before the 1990s, most policy progress was achieved through the courts or devolved levels of government (Studlar, 2002) . In the UK, fewer influential venues were apparent before the late 1990s and even now their influence is uncertain (particularly since devolved policy differences are more constrained within a unitary state -Cairney, forthcoming 2006). Second, there is no demonstration that public and media attention determines the nature or intensity of governmental response. A discussion of narratives reinforces this point. The dominance narrative suggests that the post-war policy response was to minimise wider demands for change. Public health concerns (reinforced by public and media attention) were addressed with a combination of voluntary agreements and an appeal to individual choice. While policy appeared to change, the key policy instruments were never enforced. Twentieth century policy development is characterised by unsuccessful public health attempts to shift the policy image of tobacco within government, with little recourse to alternative venues.
If we follow the incremental narrative we see more evidence (from the 1960s) of a changing policy image within government, as attention shifted from the economic benefits of tobacco to the scientific evidence on illness. This was increasingly accepted by health ministers who took steps to limit the acceptability and prevalence of smoking. However, this was not caused by venue shift (since Parliament was often more sympathetic to tobacco interests and influence from the courts was non-existent)
or to public and media opinion at the time (since these steps were taken in spite of the electoral consequences). A more convincing explanation is that the network was never closed to health interests (particularly since the BMA was the Ministry of Health's main 'client') and adaptation to new evidence was based on the British policy style of 'bureaucratic accommodation' (see below).
The dominance narrative is more supportive of a recent punctuation regarding public places legislation. Internal stability was initially maintained by ineffective voluntary agreements, even following the election of a Labour Government in 1997 and a definitive statement on passive smoking by SCOTH in 1998. Then, devolution and the increased scope for 'venue shopping' led to the prospect of comprehensive legislation in all UK countries bar England. This contributed to increasing levels of public attention to passive smoking and shifted the policy image of tobacco (including the balance of opinion between freedom and public health). Almost all of the interviews conducted for this study point to rapid public opinion change (following the experience of Ireland and Scotland) as a key factor in policy change. The nature of attention limited the governmental response since the appeal to individual freedom was no longer consistent with the new policy image.
Yet the incremental narrative qualifies the significance of these external influences.
As the discussion of 'above and below' suggests, while the Department of Health was already committed to policy change, it rejected the approach taken by Ireland and the rest of the UK. A degree of mediation is also apparent with public opinion. Curtice the scope for parliamentary influence tends to be limited, we also need to explain the particular circumstances which led to the centrality of Parliament in this case.
Multiple Streams
Kingdon's analysis adds an extra factor to explanation. We have the redefined policy problem, we have a solution (an advertising ban; a comprehensive ban on smoking in public places) but we do not have the explanation for the adoption of that solution.
As Kingdon (1984: 165-6) comprehensive legislation (Cowley and Stuart, 2006) .
Are These Results Generalisable?
The reliance on idiosyncratic reasons for policy change leads to the problem of generalisability. There are a number of reasons to suggest that these findings are not reflected widely in British Politics. First, the level of MP interest is unusual and we should be cautious about making broad conclusions about parliamentary influence during an extended period of Labour rebellion (Cowley, 2006: 55) . Second, the nature of pressure politics was unusual. 9 Tobacco took up a disproportionate amount of BMA time and marked a departure in strategy by cancer charities (interviews, BMA and CRUK, 2006) . The case-study also highlights the success of an 'open strategy', or maintaining multiple channels of access to government, parliament and the public (Whitely and Winyard, 1987: 86-7) . This contrasts with the policy communities literature stressing insulated contacts between government and groups who agree to 'sell' the results of negotiations regardless of the level of disagreement. (Jordan and Richardson, 1987; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) . The traditional 'British policy style' was to seek consensus through 'bureaucratic accommodation' removed from the glare of public attention. This process often took place between conflicting groups following the "realization that both sides could 'win'" (Jordan and Richardson, 1981: 80-1; Jordan and Maloney, 1997: 578; Cairney 2006 
Conclusion
UK tobacco policy appears to be characterised by rapid change following long periods of stability. To an extent we can explain stability with reference to post-war socioeconomic conditions: tobacco was an important source of jobs and revenue, smoking prevalence was high and anti-smoking legislation was perceived to be unpopular.
However, there is disagreement about the effect this had on policy. The dominance narrative suggests that a producer dominated policy network was formed around the definition of tobacco as an economic issue. Public health interests were excluded from the core network. Although the evidence linking smoking to illness was increasingly accepted within government, the policy response was minimal. The definition of smoking as an issue of choice ensured that voluntary agreements (rarely enforced) were chosen over legislation. The incremental narrative suggests that the exclusion of science and medicine was exaggerated. Policy change was incremental but on a clear path towards tobacco control. While the policy response to advertising and public places was often limited, it signalled that legislation would follow if selfregulation failed.
The narratives serve two crucial functions in the explanation of policy change. First, they promote clarity on the extent and meaning of change. The dominance narrative describes recent legislation as a sea change in policy and a challenge to vested interests and inertia in government. This is challenged by the incremental narrative which sees legislation as a logical progression of policy. Second, this discussion is crucial since the nature of change determines the value of explanatory models.
Models which highlight the influence of external factors are most impressive if we identify long-term internal stability. If the UK was already on a clear path towards tobacco control then their value is less clear.
The extent to which tobacco advertising legislation was caused by events above-andbelow varies by narrative. There is evidence of multi-level governance in the dispersal of power to the EU and Scotland, with venue shift producing polices that influenced the UK. The need to implement an EU Directive coupled with pressure from Scotland suggests that a recalcitrant UK government was coerced into action.
However, since Scottish activity did not particularly register in Westminster and the UK's legislation went beyond EU requirements, there is a high degree of voluntary transfer consistent with the preferred incremental approach. This argument is clearer with public places in which there is little EU pressure. While the prospect of a comprehensive ban in the rest of the UK was embarrassing and the evidence from Ireland was impressive, the UK government drew on a wider international evidence base which was more of a fit with its approach.
Policy networks analysis suggests that while socio-economic shifts strengthen public health interests, policy change is not inevitable. With the ACF we see pro-tobacco weakened, but the long-term propensity of the policy broker to accept its core argument (economy and freedom over health) explains why change was limited. In the face of external shocks, pro-tobacco was willing to adapt to maintain its dominance, and has done so successfully for decades. However, the ACF struggles to explain significant change as well as it explains stability. Change comes from external shocks but also constitutional pressures, which to the ACF are sources of stability. The lesson from MLG is that the fluid constitutional position is as much a source of change, with venue shift often a key determinant of government policy.
With punctuated equilibrium we explain stability with reference to a dominant policy image within a policy monopoly. Change results from a challenge to that image, often by appealing to venues outside of the policy monopoly, to widen participation and focus attention on different aspects of the policy problem. However, it is difficult to identify this punctuation in post-war UK tobacco. The dominance narrative suggests that policy change was minimal and there were few influential venues outside government. While the incremental narrative points to a shift of attention and problem definition within government, this was despite public opinion and the lack of alternative venues. Rather, the policy network was never closed to health interests and policy changed through the normal process of bureaucratic accommodation. The dominance narrative is more sympathetic to the idea of a more recent punctuation caused by rising attention to passive smoking. By the early 2000s the policy environment had changed, with devolution providing scope for external influence.
Public attention to the effects of passive smoking (and policy in the rest of the UK) is cited by most interviewees as a key reason for policy change. This new image of tobacco was crucial since it limited the choices available to government. However, the incremental narrative points to the mediation of public pressure. The evidence suggests that while public opinion was changing quickly from 2004, the UK government line did not.
In all cases, a discussion of the unusual significance of venue shift to Westminster is necessary to fully explain the adoption of comprehensive legislation. This depended on a series of events which came together at the right time -rapid shifts of public opinion; high levels of pressure participant activity; a strong Health Secretary; and previous Labour rebellions ensuring a free vote. Without the latter, the Labour whip combined with Conservative opposition to legislation would have ensured the more limited government policy.
This reliance on idiosyncratic explanation may undermine generalisability and the results of this case study have qualified relevance to the study of UK public policy as a whole. However, variations by policy sector and sub-sector over time are a permanent feature of policy analysis. This variation affects the value of different models of policy change and therefore reinforces the significance of a multiple lenses approach. Demonstrates inertia and the difference between commitments made in opposition and actions when in government Represents a greater commitment to, and acceleration of, tobacco control
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